

Long-term trends in part-time work

Rachel Scarfe, University of Edinburgh

rscarfe@ed.ac.uk

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Motivation

Part I: Key facts about trends in part-time work

- **Fact 1** Increase in the *quantity* of PT work
- **Fact 2** Increase in the *relative price* of PT work

Part II: Model incorporating part-time work

- ‘Task-based’ approach
- Coexistence of full- and part-time jobs in equilibrium
- Convex hours-earnings relationship in equilibrium

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Why is this important?

- **Theoretical:** non-linear hours-earnings profile
- **Policy:** inequality in hours

Empirical investigation


- Quarterly Labour Force Survey
 - Long-term data on hours and earnings - cover the whole business cycle
 - Individual characteristics - selection in PT/FT work
- Key variables:
 - TTUSHR: Total usual hours worked in main job (including overtime)
 - GRSSWK: Gross weekly pay in main job
 -
- Sample selection:
 - Part-time if working < 31 hours a week
 - Age between 16 and 64
 - Working between 5 and 70 hours a week

Fact 1 Increase in the *quantity* of PT work


Increase in PT work in some segments of the labour force

- before GFC - growth in the % of employed men with main job PT (PT share), offsets declining female PT share
- after GFC - sharp growth in the PT share of both genders


Figure 1: Part-time workers (as % of working population)



Male



Female



All


Source: LFS

Fact 1 Increase in the *quantity* of PT work


Conditional on working PT, weekly hours have increased

- PT workers are doing more hours than previously
- the share of total working hours done by PT workers has increased


Figure 2: Distribution of PT workers by usual weekly working hours



1-10 hours per week



11-20 hours per week



21-30 hours per week


Source: LFS

Fact 1 Increase in the *quantity* of PT work

Overall, more work is being done by PT workers

- the share of total working hours done by PT workers has increased
- increase in 'PT share of all hours' from 17% in 1994 to 22% in 2013

Figure 3: Distribution of PT workers by usual weekly working hours



Male

Female

All


Source: LFS

Fact 2 Changing (relative) price of part-time work

Part-time pay penalty has decreased

$$\log w_{it} = \beta_t PT_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Figure 4: Trend in the part-time pay penalty



Source: LFS



Unadjusted

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$$\log w_{it} = \beta_t PT_{it} + X_{it}\gamma + \epsilon_{it}$$

Figure 4: Trend in the part-time pay penalty



Source: LFS


Fact 2 Changing (relative) price of part-time work

Non-linear hours-earnings relationship

- Doesn't change much over time

$$\log e_{it} = \sum_{h \in H} \beta_h d_{ih} + \epsilon_{it} \quad ; \quad h \in H = \{5, 10, 15, \dots, 70\}$$

Figure 5: Cross-sectional hours-earnings profile



Unadjusted

Source: LFS


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Non-linear hours-earnings relationship


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Figure 5: Cross-sectional hours-earnings profile



Unadjusted



Adjusted for worker and job characteristics

Source: LFS

Further empirical work

- PT work very concentrated in certain industries/occupations
 - Hospitality, service
 - Lower occupational skill requirements (Hirsch, 2005)
- **Question:** Is this related to different *tasks*?
 - Fewer communicating, co-ordinating, analysing tasks?
 - More caring, interacting directly with customers tasks?
- Analysis of PT/FT tasks
 - link LFS data to O*NET task requirements
 - investigate which tasks can predict the PT share within an occupation
 - investigate which tasks are associated with a higher part-time pay penalty

Research questions

Aim of this model: a neoclassical model incorporating PT work in a flexible way, explaining

- workers' *and* firms' preferences for FT/PT work
- the higher hourly wage of FT relative to PT workers


Disentangle the causes of changes in relative quantity and price of PT work

- changes in worker preferences?
- changes in firm technology?


Overview

Output = combination of output from 2 occupations with different tasks


- “Simple” occupation: all tasks the same length
- “Complex” occupation: tasks have uncertain length



Equilibrium



Equilibrium earnings as a function of hours



Equilibrium earnings as a function of hours

Conclusion

- Long term increase in *both* quantity and relative price of PT work
- Trends are more pronounced for men
- Created a model that replicates
 - part-time pay penalty/non-linear hours-earnings schedule
 - occupational sorting of FT/PT workers
- Extensions to empirical work
 - investigate differences in FT/PT tasks
- Extensions to model
 - individual productivity - allows people to work long hours in low-pay occupations
 - gender differences in preferences

Extra material: Model

Previous approaches

- Bick, Blandin, Rogerson (2020) ; Erosa, Fuster, Kambourov and Rogerson (2018)
 - Assume earnings convex in hours
- Yurdagel (2018); Battisti et al. (2021)
 - Complementarities between individual workers
- Lariau (2018) ; Kang et al. (2020)
 - CES function with FT and PT work

Set up:

- Measure one of workers indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$
- Representative firm produces using occupations indexed by $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$
- Workers must choose which occupation. Expected production in occupation j is $E[y_j(h)]$
- Measure m_{hj} work in occupation j for $h \in [0, H]$ hours
- Total output

$$Y = \Gamma \left(\sum_{j=1}^J A_j Y_j^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

$$Y_j = \int_0^H E[y_j(h)] m_{hj} dh$$

Set up:

- Representative firm's problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{m_{hj}\}, h \in [0, H], j=1, \dots, J} E[Y] - \sum_{j=0}^J \int_0^H e_j(h) m_{hj} dh \\ \text{s.t. } Y = \Gamma \left(\sum_{j=1}^J A_j Y_j^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \end{aligned}$$

- In a competitive market, with perfect substitution ($\rho = 1$)

$$e_j(h) = \Gamma A_j E[y_j(h)]$$


Occupations and tasks

- Tasks arrive at Poisson rate λ
- Length of each task, $x \in [0, H]$, drawn from a distribution $G_j(x)$
- Production equal to the number of tasks completed by the end of the period
- Expected individual production for someone working h hours

$$E[y_j(h)] = \lambda \int_0^h G_j(x) dx$$

Derivation

Occupations and tasks




Occupations and tasks

- With Reverse Pareto distribution of task lengths, $G_j(x) = \left(\frac{x}{H}\right)^{\alpha_j}$, $\alpha_j > 0$

$$E[y_j(h)] = \lambda \frac{h^{\alpha_j+1}}{H^{\alpha_j}(\alpha_j + 1)}$$

- With $\alpha_j \rightarrow 0$, $E[y_j(h)] \rightarrow \lambda h$



Set up: Workers

1. Choose optimal hours for each occupation h_j given disutility of labour $\phi_i \in [\phi_{min}, \phi_{max}]$ with distribution $H(\phi)$
2. Choose occupation

$$\max_{j \in [1, \dots, J]} \{U_j(h_j)\} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad U_j(h_j) = \max_{h_c} z_{ij} e_j(h_j) - \frac{\phi_i h_j^{1+\theta}}{1+\theta}$$

- Equate the marginal disutility of work to marginal earnings in task j
- Workers sort into occupations based on ϕ_i, z_{ij}

$$h_j^* = \left(\frac{z_{ij} e'_j(h)}{\phi_i} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}}$$

Example

- Two occupations with $\alpha_1 > 0, \alpha_1 \rightarrow 0$ and $A_1 > A_2$
- $z_{ij} = 1$ for all workers in all occupations
- Equilibrium consists of earnings functions $e_1(h), e_2(h)$, allocation m_{h1}, m_{h2}
 1. firms solve the profit maximisation problem
 2. workers solve the utility maximisation problem
 3. the market for labour clears
- Proposition
 1. In equilibrium, there exists \hat{h} where $e_1(\hat{h}) = e_2(\hat{h})$. For $h < \hat{h}$, $e_1(\hat{h}) < e_2(\hat{h})$ and for $h > \hat{h}$, $e_1(\hat{h}) > e_2(\hat{h})$


Proposition Part 1

Equilibrium earnings

$$e_1(h) = \Gamma\lambda A_1 \frac{h^{\alpha_1+1}}{H^{\alpha_1}(\alpha_1 + 1)}$$

$$e_2(h) = \Gamma\lambda A_2 h$$

Figure 6: Equilibrium earnings as a function of hours




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 2. Workers with low ϕ choose Occupation 1, workers with high ϕ choose Occupation 2
 3. If $H(\phi)$ is continuous, there is a worker with $\phi \in [\phi_{min}, \phi_{max}]$ that is indifferent between the occupations

Proposition Part 2

$$PTPP = \frac{e_1(h)/h}{e_2(h)/h} = \frac{A_1 h_1^\alpha}{A_2 H_1^\alpha (\alpha_1 + 1)}$$

Figure 7: Utility indifference curves




Proposition Part 3

Sorting

- $h_2^* < \hat{h}$: choose occupation 2 for h_2^* hours
- $h_2^* > \hat{h}$ and $h_1^* > H$: choose occupation 1 for H hours
- $h_2^* > \hat{h}$ and $\hat{h} < h_1^* < H$: choose occupation 2 for h_1^* hours

Figure 8: Utility indifference curve of a worker indifferent between occupations



Calibration

Changes in parameters govern the relative quantity and price of PT/FT work

- Worker preferences \rightarrow changing $G(\phi)$
 - different for men/women?
- Firm technology \rightarrow changing α, ρ (?)
 - relative productivity and substitutability of PT/FT work
- Aggregate productivity \rightarrow changing Γ

Next step: calibration of parameters

- Need a way to separately identify ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ parameters

Derivation of expected production

- $E[y(h)]$ - expected production for working h hours
- $N(h)$ - number of tasks that arrive in working week
- $y_k(h)$ - production from the k -th task, $k = 1, \dots, N(h)$
- T_i - arrival time of k -th task

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[y(h)] &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} E[y(h)|N(h) = n]P(N(h) = n) \\
 &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} E\left[\sum_{k=0}^n y_k(h)|N(h) = n\right]P(N(h) = n) \\
 &= E\left[\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \sum_{k=0}^n E[y_k(h)]P(N(h) = n)\right]
 \end{aligned}$$

Derivation of expected production

T_i is a uniform random variable on the interval $[0, h]$

$$\begin{aligned} E[y_k(h)] &= \int_0^h E[y_k(h)|T_i = x] \frac{1}{h} dx \\ &= \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h G(h-x) dx \\ &= \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h G(u) du \end{aligned}$$


Expected production is

$$\begin{aligned} E[y(h)] &= \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h G(u) du \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} P(N(h) = n) \\ &= \frac{1}{h} \int_0^h G(u) du E[N(h)] \\ &= \lambda \frac{h^{\alpha+1}}{H^{\alpha}(\alpha+1)} \end{aligned}$$

Extra material: Motivating facts

Bunching at FT hours


Figure 9: Weekly hours



Source: LFS

Benefits schedule

Figure 10: Weekly income for a single parent with 1 child (2020)



Source: Resolution Foundation