

# Marital Age Gaps and Educational Homogamy Evidence from a Compulsory Schooling Reform in the UK

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# Acknowledgement and Disclaimer

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Choice of spouse is one of the most important lifetime decisions

- May affect your LF participation, accepted wage
- May affect your health and happiness
- May affect your children's outcomes
- Household formation is an important determinant of intergenerational mobility and income inequality


Who you meet and marry depends on individual characteristics - but two noticeable features emerge in the majority of marriages:

- Husbands tend to be older than their wives
- Positive assortative matching on education between spouses

# UN World Marriage Data 2012

## Marriage age by gender for 218 countries

- 45 degree line would be equally aged spouses



# Positive Sorting on Education

Assortative matching on education due to complementarities in marital output (Becker 1973, 1974, JPE) is a well-established phenomenon in the marriage literature:

- Mare (ASR,1991) shows increasing homogamy in US data
- Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (QJE,2005) in a cross-country sample find 63% of marriages have equally qualified spouses.
- Sorting - higher educated people meet more similarly aged spouses in college and have smaller age gaps (Mansour and McKinnish, 2012, REStat)

# Explanations for the Positive age gap (m-f)

## 1. Gender specific roles

- It takes men longer to reveal their type (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993, JPE)

## 2. Biology

- Sex difference in fecundity explains why women marry younger (Diaz-Gimenez and Giolito, 2013, IER)

## 3. Marriage squeeze

- Fluctuations in cohort sizes affect age gaps due to excess supply and scarcity (Bergstrom and Lam, 1989)
- Cohort size positively related to marriage rates, negatively related to marital age differences (Bronson & Mazzocco, 2012)
- However Bhaskar (2012) argues secular population growth does not explain the age gap

We look at a situation where it is not possible for everyone to maintain the typical matching pattern.

Specifically we:

- Exploit a reform that induced an exogenous increase in education
  - As implemented at cohort level, implies that younger cohorts more educated relative to older cohorts
- RDD approach to examine the response in the marriage market wrt sorting on age gaps and education

Preview of Results:

- We find typical matching patterns cannot be obtained in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity
  - Spouses choose smaller age gaps and differently qualified partners
- Women affected by the reform face a disadvantage as their potential partners are from untreated cohorts

# The Role of Age Gaps in Cohort Specific Shocks

For transitory shocks to cohort sizes the age-gap is the margin of adjustment to allow the marriage market to clear

- E.g 1958-1961 famine in China (Brandt, Siow, Vogel: 2009)

In contrast to a shock to cohort size, we look at a transitory shock to cross-cohort composition wrt education distribution.

- The degree of adjustment on the age-gap will depend on the strength of the preferences for age vs education, and the number of cohorts the adjustment occurs over - Bhaskar (2012)

If a reform affects a whole cohort,

- without an age gap there is no imbalance for certain qualifications in the marriage market
- age gaps impose imbalances for certain matches.
- Some individuals will not be able to match according to **both** age gap and educational preferences

UK reform of school leaving age induces imbalance in marriage market


The Raising of the School Leaving Age (RoSLA) was enacted in 1972

- Increased minimum age from 15 to 16 years
- Affected academic cohorts from 1957, born September or later
- Effectively increased years of schooling and academic qualifications by keeping students in school until O' levels or CSEs

Literature confirms effects on earnings, child health and education, life-time wealth, happiness and crime.

# Cross-cohort qualifications imbalance

With a prevailing age gap individuals form matches across academic cohorts (women match with men from older cohort). But at the threshold this implies that candidate spouses are from different educational regimes:



1957 women - face an undersupply of equally qualified men

- Attractiveness of younger post-RoSLA men increases

1957 men - no imbalance - candidate partners are 'treated'

- 10 / 19
- In contrast, the imbalance materializes for the 1956 cohort

# Why the ONS LS?

The analysis requires rich information on both spouses

- age of each spouse - to calculate age difference
- qualifications obtained by each spouse

## ONS Longitudinal Study

- administrative data from five successive linked censuses (1971-2011)
- ca 1% sample of the population of England and Wales
- data contains rich set of socio-economic characteristics of both LS and household members (spouses)

Create two samples - husbands, wives:

- Both spouses born in UK and resident in England & Wales at time of census
- Prime age individuals born 1951-1962
- Exclude age gaps  $> \pm 10$  years


Regression discontinuity (RD) approach. As running variable discretely measured we apply parametric estimation following Lee & Card (2008):

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha_0 + D_j\beta_0 + P_j^l\gamma_0 + (D_j \times P_j^l)\delta_0 + \epsilon_{ij}$$


Where  $Y_{ij}$  is the outcome for individual  $i$  born in month  $j$ ;  $D_j$  is a treatment indicator (1 if MOB  $j$  Sept 57 or later); using polynomial functions  $P_j^l$  with ( $l=1,2,3$ ).

- Ludwig & Miller (2007) cross-validation procedure for choice of bandwidth
- AIC and Lee & Card (2008) G-stat to determine polynomial degree

# Impact on qualifications




(a) Married women




(b) Married men

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study.

# Impact on Spousal Age Difference




(a) Married women




(b) Married men

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study.

# Impact on Qualifications Difference



(a) Married women



(b) Married men

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study.

# Analytical Results

	Wives			Husbands		
	Qual	Agediff	Qualdiff	Qual	Agediff	Qualdiff
RoSLA	0.133** (0.012)	-2.192** (0.417)	-0.085** (0.007)	0.139** (0.011)	-0.630 (0.313)	0.073** (0.015)
N	26,068	48,097	26,068	28,147	46,533	28,147

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

We find the reform induced a substantial decrease in the marital age gap for women (2.5 months - approx 10% relative to the sample mean) and women cannot achieve same degree of qualifications sorting

Corresponding but reversed effect for men - those born just before the threshold cannot achieve typical marital matches

Our results have potential implications for analyses using compulsory schooling laws to elicit causal effects of education

- For individual outcomes the marriage market effect is another channel of the educational effect
- For household level outcomes the marriage market effect should be taken into consideration when justifying the identifying assumption
  - May be especially important for long-term outcomes, such as intergenerational effects, which are more heavily dependent on the household environment than individual outcomes

# Reflection of using ONS LS

Some set-up "costs":

- Detailed application required
- SURE training
- Access only via SRS
- Clearance procedures

But many advantages:

- Very helpful helpdesk
- Detailed documentation for data cleaning/analysis
- On-site help
- Remote coding

Vast potential for future work

## Long-run Health and Mortality Effects of Exposure to Universal Health Care at Birth (with Melanie Luhrmann)

- Impact of birth exposure to universal healthcare on mortality and health around ages 50-60
- Intervention: NHS introduction in 1948
- Outcome: *very long-run, almost life-long* consequences 50 to 60 years after exposure
- Method: RD design combined with DiD exploiting geographical variation in medical services expansion